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Brexit can’t simply be written off as a protest vote by worse-off, older and less educated
voters, writes Piers Ludlow. Plenty of the so-called ‘liberal metropolitan elite’ – politicians like
Boris Johnson, business leaders and journalists – also called for Britain to leave the EU. The
dwindling number of pro-Europeans testifies to growing disillusionment with the European
Union among the UK political elite.
A great deal of the post-referendum analysis focused on the geographical, socio-economic
and demographic divide between the typical ‘leave’ voter and those who voted ‘remain’. We
have thus learned that support for Leave was disproportionately rural rather than urban, poorer, less educated, older
and less liberal, than the 48% who opted for ‘remain’. This is important information, with serious implications for
present and future governments as they seek to re-connect with, and assuage the fears of, those who feel
marginalised, alienated, and hurt by globalisation, immigration, and other 21st-century economic realities.
These findings can also have the effect, intentional or unintentional, of absolving large parts of the educated, liberal
and cosmopolitan elite from the referendum’s outcome. Brexit becomes something that was done to ‘us’, by another
Britain, whose values, attitudes and world-views are utterly different from ‘our’ own. This is a very human reaction. It
mirrors the tactics adopted by most liberal Americans during the George W. Bush presidency, or educated Italians
while Silvio Berlusconi ruled their country. But it is seriously misleading. For there were at least three ways in which
Britain’s political elite, including many of those who voted remain, played their part in the electoral outcome.
A pro-EU protest in Parliament Square after the referendum, July 2016. Photo: Ben Scicluna via a
The first and most obvious centres on the number of mainstream figures who joined the Leave campaign .  In
marked contrast to 1975, the referendum of 2016 was not a tussle between, on one side, a bizarre alliance of
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extremists, notable for the general wildness of their views, and a solid phalanx of ‘respectable’ opinion leaders on
the other. Instead, there were a significant number of mainstream politicians campaigning for Brexit, flanked by a
vocal minority of business leaders, journalists, and even the occasional academic. Theirs may have been a
dissident view, but it was a dissident view no longer confined to the fringes of British politics but instead regarded as
being within the parameters of normal opinion. Partly as a result, far fewer corporate entities, from businesses to
universities via the Church of England, felt able to take the unambiguously pro-European stand they had in 1975.
Second was the all but total disappearance from the British political landscape of out-and-out pro-
Europeans. In 1975 Harold Wilson had been able to play a role in the referendum campaign to which David
Cameron would have been eminently suited, namely that of the mild sceptic, uncertain as to whether ‘Europe’ was a
good thing or not, but ultimately swayed into the ‘yes’ camp by a combination of the renegotiation deal he had been
able to secure and the weight of the ‘yes’ arguments.
He could play this fence-sitting role, since the pro-European case could be left to pro-Europeans like Edward Heath,
Roy Jenkins, Willie Whitelaw or Shirley Williams. And as a fence-sitter who ultimately decided that it was safer to
stay in, his views chimed with those of much of the British public and helped convince many others who were
unsure into casting their votes for the ‘yes’ side. But in 2016 Cameron was unable to replicate this strategy given the
absence of prominent pro-Europeans on whom he could rely.
The pro-European wing of the Conservative Party had all but vanished, Labour pro-Europeans were in disarray and
stymied by a party leader with little sympathy for their cause, and the Lib Dems had been virtually wiped out by the
2015 election result. It was thus up to the Prime Minister and George Osborne to articulate the pro-EU case. And
their credibility in doing so was always bound to be limited. This was the same Prime Minister who only a few years
earlier had seemingly relished his role in blocking an EU deal designed to resolve the Euro crisis, and had pointedly
stayed away from the ceremony at which the EU had been given the Nobel Peace prize in 2012. And if he really did
believe that the EU and British membership in it was fundamental to European peace and security as was claimed
in one of his campaign speeches, why was he putting peace and security at risk by holding a referendum on the
issue in the first place?
Third, and much more insidious, was the way in which large swathes of the British political elite, including many
who would ultimately advocate ‘Remain’ and who have professed great regret at the outcome of the referendum,
had been highly critical of the EU over much of the preceding decade and a half . Like any political system, the
EU is an entirely legitimate target for close political scrutiny and critique. Furthermore, the succession of crises that
have beset the EU since the turn of the century gave would-be critics in parliament, in the media and elsewhere
plentiful ammunition. But so relentless had been the barrage of criticism, with little space devoted by contrast to the
many aspects of European integration that continued to work well, or to those parts of Europe which rode out the
aftermath of the 2007 economic crisis rather more successfully than did the UK, that it substantially weakened the
terrain on which the pro-Remain battle needed to be fought.
After all, if the EU really was a deeply flawed and undemocratic entity, liable imminently to collapse under the
combined effects of the ‘failed’ single currency and its inability to control migration, then Britain was surely better off
deserting it – and perhaps in the process leading others away from the disaster also? And given such a background,
was there any wonder then that the multiplicity of statistics produced by Remainers purporting to demonstrate the
extent to which British economic prosperity was inextricably tied up with continued EU membership failed to gain
much traction with the wider public?
Taken together all three of these points do rather underline that the referendum outcome was not just a rebellion by
those who the British political system had traditionally marginalised. Instead it was an electoral verdict rooted as
much in the ambivalence about European integration felt by Britain’s political elite, as it was in the anger of those
who had done poorly out of globalisation, who resented the way in which Britain was changing, and who were
scared by immigration. As such, understanding what happened will also involve the liberal elite looking itself in the
mirror rather than simply attributing the outcome to another Britain of which they were barely aware.
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